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1. Introduction 
During the nineties labor market deregulation emerged internationally as a key policy recommendation (Imf, 
1999; Oecd, 1994a), partly owing to the good economic performance of some low-protection countries 
(Elmsekov et al. 1998; Grubb and Wells 1993; Heckman and Pagés 2000; Lazear 1990). In most Oecd 
countries, this piece of advice has been for long understood in terms of partial labor market reforms and of 
liberalization of temporary contracts (Boeri, 2010). In more recent years, the sovereign debt crisis, and the 
pressure on public finance that followed, have created the conditions to proceed to a further weakening of 
Employment Protection Legislations (EPL), in particular for workers with open-ended contracts (Hastings and 
Heyes, 2016). These reforms are generally justified under the economic argument of inefficient retention 
(Bassanini and Ernst, 2002; Bierhanzl, 2005): high firing costs ought to be reduced as they are likely to prevent 
firms from separating from insufficiently productive matches. At the same time, low workers’ turnover – a 
consequence of high EPL – would harm the ability of a labor market to match efficiently the right workers to 
the right jobs (Rogerson, 1987). The implication - it is argued - is that average productivity falls and the 
economic system becomes less competitive. In turn, poor competitiveness weakens economic growth and, 
ultimately, employment. 
This article aims at testing whether changes in EPL may actually be able to trigger a key economic 
mechanism that supposedly enhance a country’s economic performance, i.e. to improve the quality of job 
matches through a faster workers’ turnover, and to study its implications in terms of productivity. To do so, 
we provide econometric evidence based on a difference-in-differences (DD) identification strategy and Italian 
micro-data on workers and firms. The DD setup is offered by a recent Italian reform, the so-called “Fornero 
Law” (after the name of the Italian Labor Minister under the Monti government), which changed EPL for 
open-ended contracts differently for companies of different sizes. While much of the literature has focused 
on the employment and welfare effects of changes in the legal dispositions for temporary contracts (e.g., 
Berton et al., 2012; Barbieri et al., 2016; Cappellari et al. 2012), less is known about reforms affecting 
mandated job protection provisions for open-ended contracts, and very little about their impact on the 
quality of job matches. Our paper intends to contribute to fill such literature gap. 
Despite providing weaker external validity, a case study based on the empirical strategy we discuss 
below can offer complementary insights with respect to comparative analyses, and has a number of 
distinctive strengths. First, due to the unparalleled identification conditions that its design provides with, the 
Italian 2012 reform allows to grant a high internal validity of results relying upon microdata. Second, case 
studies are less vulnerable from confounding factors related to international differences in labor market 
institutions, including welfare programs and their functional equivalents, which can be difficult to control for 
in cross-country empirical studies. Our DD estimates hold constant any institutional specificity, and are also 
robust to any institutional changes that have broadly interested all workers and firms in the country. Third, 
Italy – along with Spain, where an analogous reform has been introduced in the same year – represents an 
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unprecedented example of deregulation of open-ended contracts (Meardi, 2014; Picot and Tassinari, 2017). 
Fourth, Italy is also one of the most indebted countries of the Euro area (Perez and Rhodes, 2014) and a 
learning example of labor market reforms under austerity (Picot and Tassinari, 2017; Sacchi, 2015). 
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we provide an account of the reform under scrutiny, 
highlighting why its design is particularly apt to measure the impact of EPL reduction. In section 3, we first 
discuss the theoretical background of labor market deregulation and of its potential implications in terms of 
job match quality and human capital accumulation. We then provide a summary report of the related 
measurement issues, and of how we operationalize the quality of the match between firms and workers. We 
also identify the literature gap that we aim to fill with the present contribution and introduce our hypotheses. 
In section 4, we present the data and the empirical model; results are discussed in section 5. Section 6 
describes the results about our mediating hypothesis – that the reform enhanced worker turnover. Sections 
7 and 8 respectively discuss the results in terms of firm productivity, and draw some tentative concluding 
remarks. 
 
 
2. Institutional background: the Fornero reform 
 
Although this view is not unchallenged (Contini and Revelli, 1992; Contini and Trivellato, 2005; Del Conte et 
al., 2004), Italy has for long represented the epitome of labor market rigidity (Oecd, 1994b). This argument 
largely relied upon the Italian regulations on individual layoffs that have been in force since 1970. According 
to Laws 604/1966 and 300/1970, an employer is legitimated to dismiss a worker if a just cause exists (damage 
of equipment, fight or violence) or in case of a justified reason, that can be either subjective (major breaches 
of contract obligations) or objective, when the organization of the production process would make it 
impossible the continuation of the employment relationship. The consequences of unlawful dismissals 
depend then upon the firm’s size. In those employing more than fifteen workers, an illegitimate layoff is 
deprived of any legal effect, gives the dismissed worker the option to be reinstated to her former position, 
and leads to the compensation of all foregone salaries and social security contributions since the layoff date. 
In firms below the 15-employee threshold, the employer is obliged to choose between starting a new 
employment relationship with the dismissed worker, or to compensate her with a sum ranging from 2.5 to 
14 monthly salaries.1 
With the installment of the Monti government in November 2011, the new Labor Minister Elsa 
Fornero quickly succeeded to reduce employment protection in firms above the fifteen-employee threshold. 
Namely, Law 92/2012 – in force since July 18th – rules that in cases of layoffs motivated under a disciplinary 
                                                          
1 See Berton et al. (2012) and Sacchi (2015) for a full account of labor market reforms in Italy since the late XIX century. 
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reason that a labor court rules illegitimate, reinstatement is possible only if the judge deems that the 
supposed just cause or justified subjective reason simply did not exist, or that according to the relevant 
collective agreement, it should have been punished otherwise. Moreover, the dismissed worker is entitled 
of a compensation ranging from five to twelve monthly salaries, on top of all foregone social security 
contributions. Instead, in the other cases in which a disciplinary layoff is judged illegitimate, the dismissed 
workers are only entitled to a monetary compensation ranging from twelve to twenty-four monthly salaries. 
For layoffs motivated by an economic reason, instead, reinstatement is possible only if no justified objective 
reason actually existed; in those cases, laid-off workers are also entitled to a monetary compensation ranging 
from five to twelve monthly salaries. In all the remaining situations of unlawful economic dismissals, workers 
are only entitled to a monetary compensation ranging from twelve to twenty-four monthly salaries. Hence, 
in firms above the fifteen-employee threshold, the Fornero reform (i) deprived the workers of the option to 
choose between reinstatement and monetary reparation; (ii) limited the room for reinstatement to a list of 
well-defined cases; (iii) reduced the amount of total compensation; (iv) reduced uncertainty about the 
duration and expenses of litigations (Ichino and Pinotti, 2012). 
Two features of the reform make it a particularly apt case to study empirically the implications of EPL 
reforms at the micro level. First, the compensation scheme for unlawful dismissals has been changed for a 
subset only of firms. This has generated a quasi-experimental situation with treated and control units that 
can be studied with a DD approach. In other words, the reform provides variation both across firms and time 
that we exploit for identification. In addition, Law 92/2012 is a clear example of a top-down reform, with 
little involvement of local social partners and under the co-ordination of the EU within the realm of austerity 
reforms (Picot and Tassinari, 2017; Sacchi, 2015). This further contributes to make Law 92/2012 largely 
exogenous to the Italian pre-existing dynamics, preventing issues of reverse causality. 
 
 
3. Skill allocation and skill development: theories and measurement issues 
 
3.1 Theoretical background 
Labor markets are characterized by continuous flows of workers in and out of unemployment, and from one 
job to another. This process is generally labelled workers’ turnover and it is well-established in both the 
theoretical (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Bertola, 1990) and empirical literature (Cazes, 2013; Noelke, 2011; 
Oecd, 2004) that it is negatively affected by EPL. In this perspective, reducing EPL in order to increase workers’ 
turnover may be desirable inasmuch as a higher worker reallocation should also entail that workers move 
more easily to the positions where their skills are more productive (Rogerson, 1987).   
This view, however, only considers how EPL affects the allocation of given skills upon jobs, but 
neglects that EPL also influences skill development, i.e. the fact that skill levels and composition change and 
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evolve over time (also) as a consequence of the employment protection regime they are subject to. Acemoglu 
and Pischke (1998; 1999) are among a number of authors suggesting that – when employment protection is 
higher, the allocation of workers to jobs is less efficient, and employment relationships last longer – workers 
and firms invest more in specific skills. Within this standard economic view, specific knowledge emerges from 
inefficient labor markets, in turn related to the existence of matching frictions, of which EPL provisions are a 
leading example. 
On the contrary, institutional political economy highlights that once labor market imperfections are 
embedded into their “dense network of political and socioeconomic institutions” (Busemayer and 
Trampusch, 2012, p. 7), EPL - instead of being a given constraint - emerges as an endogenous feature of real 
labor markets. Following the transaction cost theory by Williamson (1981), Iversen and Soskice (2001) and, 
more in general, the literature on Varieties of Capitalisms (e.g. Estevez-Abe et al., 2001; Hall and Soskice, 
2001; Thelen, 2004) suggest that the degree of EPL that characterizes a labor market follows – jointly with its 
functional complements like unions, income-maintenance schemes, internal labor markets, but also 
technological paradigms (Harcourt and Wood, 2007) – from an efficient process in which employers and 
workers cooperate to raise the system’s productivity. Within this literature – and compared to the two ideal-
types of Coordinated (CMEs) and Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) – Italy emerges, along with France and 
other Southern European countries, as a “mixed case”, sharing some of the features of CMEs (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001) and, in particular, a high degree of EPL (Estevez-Abe, 2008). Alternatives to the VoC view – 
although suggesting that the relationship between strictness of EPL and skill specificity may go the other way 
around (Emmenegger, 2009; Goldthorpe, 2000) or that, far from coordination, EPL regimes emerge from 
different power relationships between political groups (Saint-Paul, 2000; Streeck, 2012) – still maintain that 
not only EPL affects skill allocation and development, but is also in turn subject to preferences that depend 
on workers’ skills and on production technologies.  
This essential literature overview suggests therefore that the relationships between EPL and skills is 
significative, complex, and circular. It is influenced by labor market transitions and entails at least three steps: 
first, workers’ turnover – as directly affected by EPL – determines the allocation of existing workers’ skills 
upon jobs. Second, once workers and jobs are matched, those given skills develop in a way that depends on 
the expected duration of the employment relationship, which, again, is a consequence (also) of EPL. Third, 
skills – because of their evolution during the employment relationship – shape preferences over EPL. While 
the empirical analysis of this article is essentially directed at the first one of these steps, we will also provide 
discussion and analyses touching, albeit more indirectly, upon the second step of skill development and the 
overall productivity effects of EPL.  
So, “how does EPL affect the allocation of existing skills upon jobs?” and “Does it actually improve the 
quality of matches as suggested by economic theory?” are questions that pose a non-trivial measurement 
issue: we need to study the relationship between EPL and job-match quality in a way that prevents the issue 
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of circular causality put forward above. This is exactly the problem solved by the design of the Fornero 
reform. 
 
3.2 Measurement issues 
Despite the central role for recent labor market reforms of the relationship between EPL and human capital, 
related empirical evidence has mostly focused on the “reduced form” of the underlying theoretical model, 
trying to assess directly the impact of labor market deregulation on employment and unemployment (Cazes, 
2013; Noelke, 2015; Oecd, 2004). The reason has been fourfold. First, right or wrong, knowing about the 
consequences of labor market institutions on employment performance was regarded of much higher policy 
relevance. Second, the relationship between employment protection and the quality of job-worker matches 
is more micro in nature and raises issues of data availability. Third, measuring the quality of a match is not 
trivial and requires information that is not commonly collected in labor market databases. Fourth, as already 
discussed above, the causality of this relationship is circular; hence, credible identification of the effect of 
EPL on match quality hinges on the availability of quasi-experimental conditions. 
Today a renewed interest for knowledge-based economy, human capital accumulation and active 
ageing has circumvented the first limitation (policy relevance). The European Commission’s communications 
such as “New skills for new jobs” (EC, 2008), “Agenda for new skills and jobs” (EC, 2010) and the latest "A 
New skills agenda for Europe" (EC, 2016) all witness how the skill formation plays a primary role within the 
European strategy towards Europe 2020. The European Center for the Development of Vocational Training 
(Cedefop, 2009) has recognized this issue through the identification of five priorities for research: (i) improve 
measurement of skills and skills mismatch; (ii) examine the persistence of skill mismatch and its impacts; (iii) 
improve understanding of skill mismatch processes, its dynamics and the consequences of skill mismatch; 
(iv) focus on skill mismatch for vulnerable groups on the labor market; and (v) improve data availability and 
use.Data availability and use – to put it in Cedefop’s terms and to move to the second limitation listed above 
– has already improved a lot thanks to the collection of large sets of survey-based micro data, the availability 
of Longitudinal Matched Employer-Employee Databases and, most notably, to the realization of dedicated 
surveys like the Oecd’s Survey of Adult Skills (Oecd, 2016). 
Instead, more concerns exist upon measuring the quality of a match, even when its assessment 
narrows to that of skill mismatch. In theory, the ideas of skill demand and of skill mismatch are well defined. 
The former refers to the amount and type of human capital that an employer deems ideal to carry out the 
job for which the related vacancy was opened; the latter refers instead to the distance between skill demand 
and the amount and type of human capital possessed by the workers (skill supply). Empirically, however, the 
operationalization of these ideas is not as easy. From the metrics standpoint, the literature (Flisi et al., 2014; 
ILO, 2014; Johansen and Gatelli, 2012; Quintini, 2011; Sala, 2010) highlights three different approaches. All 
of them feature strengths and weaknesses. Under the normative approach, groups of experts are interviewed 
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after the realization of the relevant matches about the skills that presumably the employers were looking for 
when they posted the relative vacancies. This approach carries the advantage of identifying separately skill 
demand and supply, but is extremely costly – what limits the size of the resulting data – and strongly country-
specific; for these reasons it is seldom used in the empirical literature. Under the subjective approach 
whether skill supply fits with skill demand is directly asked to the employed workers, sometimes in 
conjunction with their employers. This procedure is less costly and can easily be integrated within existing 
large labor market surveys, but is prone to self-assessment bias. In the objective approach, eventually, the 
distribution of employed workers’ (or of realized matches’, to use this literature’s terms) skills within each 
occupation is described in terms of its mean (or median) and dispersion: workers whose skills lay within a 
given range (usually once or twice the standard deviation) from the reference distribution point (mean, 
median) are considered well-matched. Although this approach does not really measure the distance between 
skill demand and supply – as instead it captures the dispersion of the realized market equilibrium, which is 
likely to suffer from some rationing on the supply side – it is the most widely used metrics of skill mismatch. 
If how the skill mismatch should be measured is all but commonly agreed, what should be measured 
is possibly even more discussed. Match quality is traditionally defined and measured in terms of distance 
between workers’ education and the level of education typically required in their occupations (Freeman, 
1976). However, this makes the issue of mismatch equivalent to that of over- or undereducation (Büchel et 
al., 2003; Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011), and fails to account for skill accumulation and depreciation 
occurring on the job and after entry in the labor market. For these reasons, efforts have recently been made 
in order to distinguish the educational dimension in strict sense from other dimensions. The most prominent 
of these examples is represented by the Oecd Program for the International Assessment of Adult 
Competencies (PIAAC), which collects data about numeracy and literacy at the individual level in more than 
forty countries in the world (Pellizzari and Fichen, 2013). Approaches more strictly related to the dynamics 
of employment relationships are those proposed by Ghignoni (2001) – who considers sector-specific 
individual experience – and by Estevez-Abe et al. (2001), who use job turnover. 
The fourth reason why the empirical relationship between employment protection and match quality 
has been underexplored, is that such relationship is prone to simultaneity and reverse causality issues. As 
explained above, unless the various branches of the circular relation are credibly isolated, this circularity is 
likely to cause biases in the estimated impact of EPL in any empirical model regressing match quality on 
aggregate EPL measures or on indicators of job (in)security at the individual level. This is exactly where our 
paper mainly contributes to the debate.  
 
3.3 Hypotheses and their operationalization 
We are now in a position to state our main empirical hypothesis: HP1: the Fornero reform has improved the 
probability that a worker in open-ended positions is well-matched to her job. When testing HP1, the unit of 
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observation is the individual worker, and our main outcome variable is match quality. Three reasons led us 
to assess match quality in terms of educational attainment. First, education is a certified formal skill that over 
an individual’s career varies only by natural decay, and is hence particularly apt to capture skill allocation 
with no contamination in terms of skill development. Second, education is widely used and allows 
international comparisons. Third, alternatives like PIAAC lack a proper longitudinal dimension, hence 
compromising the key possibility to use the Fornero reform as an identification device.  
From the metrics standpoint, we have chosen the objective approach, by defining a well-matched 
worker as one whose educational attainment is equal to the median educational attainment of her reference 
professional group. The objective approach circumvent the data availability problem that affects the 
normative approach, and recall and framing biases related to the subjective one. Similarly to Iversen and 
Soskice (2001) and Lazear (2009), then, we define the reference professional groups in terms of sectors and 
occupations. Namely, sectors are identified by the broad categories of the Italian ATECO2007 classification 
(manufacturing, construction, trade and other services, while agriculture is excluded from the analysis) 
whereas for the occupations we have used the categories of the national statistical office’s one-digit CP2011 
classification.2 A word of caution is in order to prevent possible misunderstandings of our statement. We are 
not testing the hypothesis that the match quality of a given worker improves after the Fornero reform; we 
are aware that a worker may even lose her job after the reform. Instead, we want to check whether the 
average match quality has improved, and we do it using individual data. 
The proper theoretical argument says that workers’ turnover – and not the Fornero reform – is 
beneficial to workers’ allocation. For HP1 to be the right empirical counterpart of allocation theory, we need 
therefore to test a second statement, i.e. our mediating hypothesis: HP2: the Fornero reform has improved 
workers’ turnover. We operationalize workers’ turnover at the firm level in terms of (i) the share of 
separations and associations over total employment, (ii) the share of associations over total employment, 
(iii) the share of separations over total employment, also (iv) purged by retirements. 
In the economic policy perspective, knowing that a higher turnover leads to better matches would 
not be of great interest unless this in turn enhances the overall system’s competitiveness, i.e. its productivity. 
However, as argued above, the final effect of EPL upon productivity does not only depend upon skills 
allocation, but also on their development. Both are influenced by EPL, and the overall balance cannot be 
decided a priori based on theoretical arguments. No clear hypothesis can hence be put forward about the 
impact of the Fornero reform upon productivity, irrespective on whether or not HP1 and HP2 hold. 
Nonetheless, we study empirically the relationship between the Fornero reform and productivity, and cast 
the related results in the light of the evidence about HP1 and HP2.  
                                                          
2 ATECO 2007 is the Italian version of NACE Rev. 2; CP2011 is very similar to ISCO08. 
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In the next section, we begin by describing the data used for testing our main hypothesis, HP1. 
Testing HP2 requires a different data source that will be described in section six. Our exploration of the impact 
of the Fornero reform on productivity is based on yet another data source, described in section seven. 
 
 
4. Data, sample selection and specification issues 
 
The effect of the reform on match quality is here carried out using individual-level quarterly data 
from the Italian Labour Force Survey (LFS). We pool the various cross-sectional surveys for the period that 
goes from the 1Q of 2011 until the 3Q of 2014 (included), excluding though the 3Q of 2012 in which the 
Fornero Law was enacted. Setting the 1Q of 2011 as the starting point of our analysis is determined by a non-
comparability with previous rounds of LFS, which adopt a different classification of economic activities and 
of occupations. Building time-consistent definitions of sectors and occupations would require a level of 
aggregation not compatible with the related literature on skill mismatch. On the other hand, the ending point 
of our study is determined by the introduction of a new law, the so-called “Jobs Act”, during the 4Q of 2014. 
Sample selection implies a potential trade-off between the capability to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity and the risk of contamination between treated and control units. Ideally, one would narrow 
the sample as much as possible around the fifteen-employee threshold. Doing so should reduce the concern 
that unobserved firm-level components, which may have an effect on the quality of matches and be 
correlated with the reform, introduces an estimate bias in the analysis. In the Italian LFS data, firm size is only 
available as an (ordered) categorical variable, and this poses limits to the way we can select our sample. In 
practice, one possibility is that we retain only workers from firms sized between eleven and nineteen 
employees, and compare workers in firms with 11-15 employees (below the threshold) and workers in firms 
with 16-19 employees (above the threshold). However, this strategy is prone to the risk of contamination. 
Imagine for instance that firm j with 15 workers before the reform grows to 16 exactly because EPL above 
the threshold is now less binding (Garibaldi et al., 2004; Torrini, 2008). After the reform firm j contributes to 
the match quality observed above the threshold with all of its employees, and not only with its new hire. As 
in LFS data we cannot identify flows but only stocks, when computing above-threshold match quality we 
would mistakenly include workers whose match quality was determined below the threshold and before the 
reform. To prevent contamination, we should hence instead avoid to include firms too close to the reform 
threshold. In terms of the available LFS classification for firm size, a second possibility is to compare firms in 
the 11-15 bracket (the control group), with those in the 20-49 one (treated group). Since the LFS is quite 
abundant of both firm- and worker-level observables, we deem the risk of omitted variable bias a minor one 
and, for most of the analysis, we proceed with the second sample-selection option (tough we conduct 
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robustness checks for this choice). After having further restricted our sample to the private nonagricultural 
sector, we remain with a final sample of 81,130 open-ended workers. 
 In order to identify the impact of the reform, we apply a difference-in-differences strategy according 
to the following specification: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 +  𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 +  𝛽4𝑋 𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡    [1]                              
 
An individual i is considered as well-matched – and hence 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 1 – if her educational attainment 
at time t (measured in quarters) is equal to the median attainment of all employees within the same 
economic activity j and occupation k at the same point in time. Our baseline specification includes a wide 
range of controls Xijkt accounting for individual demographic (sex, age, education, citizenship, region of 
residence, marital status and household type) and job (sector of economic activity, occupation type, share of 
temporary workers and full-time workers within the same sector and occupation) characteristics as major 
determinants of the level of educational (mis)match. These controls are allowed to be time-varying. The 
model is then saturated with year- (𝛾𝑡) and quarter-level (𝛿𝑡) fixed effects. Regional, sector, occupation, year 
and quarter fixed effects aim at controlling for the business cycle that may have differently affected firms 
below and above the threshold. The remaining demographic characteristics control for the labor supply 
composition that, again, may vary in small and medium-size firms.  
In addition to this specification – and in order to recognize that workers’ turnover is not immediate 
due to search frictions – we also introduce a second specification that separates the effects of the reform 
during the first year of its enactment and separately during its second year: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 +  𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇1 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇2 +  𝛽4𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇1 +  𝛽5𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇2 +  𝛽6𝑋 𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡          [2] 
 
where POST1 = 1 if we are during the first year of implementation of the reform (i.e. from 2012:Q4 to 
2013:Q3) and POST2 = 1 if during the second (i.e. from 2013:Q4 to 2014:Q3). This specification still allows to 
identify separately year and quarter fixed effects. Both models are estimated with the logit method. 
Identification of causal effects through the above-described approach relies on the assumption that, 
had the reform not been introduced – the trends of the dependent variable would be parallel between 
treated and untreated units during the reform period. This hypothesis cannot of course be tested, but –  
following Heckman and Hotz (1989) – we can get some indications by regressing the quarterly variation in 
the number of good matches recorded in cells defined by sector, occupation and class of firm size during the 
pre-treatment period only, on a dummy variable taking the value of one for firms above the threshold, 
complemented with year and quarter fixed effects. In symbols: 
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∆𝑌𝑗𝑘𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑗𝑘𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗𝑘𝑠𝑡 
 
If pre-reform trends are actually parallel, ?̂? should not be statistically different from zero. Table 1 
shows that this is actually the case. Figure 1 then plots the share of good matches in small (11-15) and large 
(20-49) firms over the period under scrutiny. The evidence further supports the idea that trends were parallel 
in the pre-reform period, and puts forward an overall slight gap in favor of larger firms. This gap seems 
actually to widen after the introduction of the reform. 
 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1 Baseline model 
The results obtained with both models [1] and [2] confirm the hypothesis that deregulation has contributed 
to improve the quality of matches in the Italian labor market. Hence, HP1 is supported by our data. In fact, 
Table 2 shows that, as an effect of the Fornero law, there was a statistically significant increase in the odds 
of being well matched: the relative risk ratio (RRR) increased by 9.5% in companies affected by the reform. 
Consistently with our expectations, the impact of this reform was not immediate: over the first year since 
the law’s enactment, no statistically significant change is visible. It is only during its second year of application 
that the entire effect was exerted with odds of being well-matched raised by almost 16%. This is consistent 
with the idea that workers’ turnover – although relatively fast – is not immediate. 
 
5.2 Robustness 
A series of robustness checks further supports our findings (Table 3). First, at the price of introducing some 
contamination between treated and untreated units (but with the advantage of reducing the room for 
unobserved heterogeneity), we focus upon firms sized around the reform threshold, i.e. on those with 11-15 
employees as the control group (as above) compared to those with 16-19 employees as the new treated 
group. While the overall effect persists but becomes non-significant at conventional levels, once we separate 
first- and second-year effects our baseline findings are confirmed, with the reform improving the odds of a 
good match by 18.5% during its second year of implementation (Panel A). Second, contamination may 
nonetheless occur also at the worker level if, for instance, treated firms grow by poaching good matches to 
untreated units. This a likely situation within tight labor markets. To circumvent this possibility we have re-
estimated our model within the ten (out of twenty) Italian regions where the level of over-education is 
highest. The rationale is that we do not expect the supply of good matches to be rationed within those 
regions. Again, results are robust (Panel B). Third, another source of potential bias is measurement error. As 
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widely described in section two, there exists a lively ongoing debate on how mismatch should be measured. 
This means that any choice is potentially prone to criticism. As a robustness, we have hence tried to redefine 
the sector- and occupation-specific educational reference point in terms of the mode (instead of the median) 
of the distribution of educational attainment. Panel C proves that results are not affected by this change. 
Finally, we consider the possibility that – having included in the sample workers aged fifteen or more – some 
workers may still be at school. After restricting the sample to individuals aged no less than twenty-five, again, 
results are confirmed (Panel D). 
 
5.3 Extensions 
A major issue is to understand whether educational mismatch has improved through a reduction of over-
education, of under-education, or both. In Table 4, Panel A, we transform our baseline model into a 
multinomial one, with three possible outcomes: good matches (the reference outcome), over-education or 
under-education. Estimates clearly show that the main driver has been a reduction in under-education. These 
results should, in our view, be read jointly with those in Panel B, where we split the sample between workers 
aged until 34, and those aged 35 or more. The effect of the reform is fully carried by the latter. This means 
that the quality of matches has improved thanks to a reduction in under-education that occurred mainly 
among mature and old-age workers. A likely interpretation of this evidence is that across the reform period 
the quality of matches has improved through the dismissal of undereducated older workers and (sometimes) 
the substitution with younger better matches. Notice that, by virtue of the lower EPL for open-ended 
contracts, firms may in principle start reducing their use of temporary contracts, with an ambiguous effect 
on the mismatch of a firm’s total workforce. We believe this substitution effect is, at best, second order, 
unable to overturn the effect on open-ended contracts, which represents the vast majority of a firm’s 
workforce. Nevertheless, we control for the share of temporary contracts in all our regressions. Finally, Panels 
C and D eventually suggest that the bulk of the effect was carried out by the service sector and in northern 
regions.3  
 
 
6. The effect of the reform on worker turnover 
 
As emphasized by the existing literature and our earlier discussion, a major channel driving the effect of the 
Fornero Law on improved qualification mismatch lies in the alleged increase in worker reallocation. While 
                                                          
3 We will have more to say on sectoral differences when discussing the productivity effects. As for the geographical 
differences, southern regions were traditionally characterized by intense turnover even before the reform, related to 
high natality/mortality of small firms, and to the diffusion of semi-legal personnel practices (Contini and Trivellato, 
2005). This might partly explain the absence of any detectable effect of the reform.  
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there is some empirical evidence suggesting that EPL may curb firms’ firing decisions, thereby also negatively 
affecting hiring plans and overall worker turnover more generally (Schivardi and Torrini, 2008), there is less 
work directly testing that reforms reducing EPL have indeed produced such effects. For instance, Kugler and 
Pica (2008) study the effect of an Italian reform of 1990 that increased EPL for small firms, while leaving it 
unchanged for larger firms. They show that worker turnover was negatively affected by this earlier reform. 
In this section, we aim at providing a preliminary assessment in the case of the Fornero Law that, to the best 
of our knowledge, has never been attempted before.  
Such an empirical investigation requires data that the LFS used earlier cannot offer. Specifically, we   
need to compare the hiring and firing rates of firms below and above the threshold, before and after the 
Fornero Law. A worker level dataset such as the LFS does not allow us to compute such rates. Hence, we need 
to resort to alternative firm-level data.  The Employer and Employee Survey (RIL) conducted by INAPP is ideal 
for the objective of this section. RIL is a nationally representative sample of firms with any number of 
employees, including the very small ones, operating in the non-agricultural private sector; the data that we 
use has been collected for the years 2010 and 2014. The surveys collect a rich set of information on personnel, 
organization, firm’s recruiting activities and other workplace characteristics. In particular, the RIL asks each 
firm in the sample about (i) the number of hires during previous year and (ii) the number of separations, 
distinguished by reason (quits, lay-offs, retirement, and other reasons).  
For each firm j in the data, and for each time period t, we can then measure worker turnover as the 
sum of accessions plus separations during the relevant survey year, divided by the firm’s total number of 
employees at the beginning of the year. We can also compute a firm’s accession rate and separation rates 
as, respectively, the fraction of accessions and separations on firm’s total employees. We then run OLS 
regressions similar to equation (1), where essentially we compare the turnover rates for firms below and 
above the threshold, before and after the 2012 reform. The results are collected in table 5. In all 
specifications, we control for regional dummies, 1-digit sectors, a cubic polynomial in firm size, and a dummy 
for incorporated business.  
The results are broadly consistent with the expectation that the Fornero Law induced treated firms 
to increase their turnover rates. The effect is positive in column (1), where we look at an overall turnover 
rate, and is also positive when we focus, separately, on the hiring (column 2) and the separation margin 
(column 3), albeit not statistically significant in the former case.  
Clearly, there are a number of limitations in such an analysis. To begin with, it is well-known that a 
firm-level survey is not exempt from measurement errors (e.g., recall bias), and that this might be a concern 
in particular for the computation of firm-level variables, which require individual-level knowledge on the 
relevant events (hires and separations). Another limitations lies in our inability to test whether, consistently 
with the results of the analyses of the previous sections, the impact of the reform only emerges after some 
time. With only the 2010 RIL surveys to serve as the “before” period and the 2014 survey for the “after” 
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period, we lack the necessary data to distinguish between the immediate and the longer-run effects. Another 
concern is related to the use of total separations, as in column (3). In fact, some of these refer to (workers’) 
voluntary separations and ought to be excluded. Similarly, since other separations originate from retirement, 
the analysis would be more convincing if based on firm-level lay-offs only. This is what we pursue in column 
(4), which shows that the effect is again positive, and statistically significant (at the 10% level). We conclude 
this section by highlighting that, while our preliminary analysis largely supports HP2, thereby providing 
further empirical support to the small existing literature suggesting that EPL is detrimental to worker 
turnover, caution should be exercised in drawing final conclusions, partly reflecting the limitations discussed 
above.  
 
 
7. Exploring the productivity effects of the reforms 
 
The evidence produced in the previous sections goes in the direction to support the trigger of Rogerson’s 
theory of workers reallocation, namely that turnover improves the quality of matches between the existing 
skill pool and jobs. One may expect this reallocation to be beneficial to productivity. Nonetheless, as 
discussed in section 3, one should distinguish between the productivity impact of shocks or policy 
interventions that simply alter the economy’s allocation of given skills, from the broader effects arising from 
changes in the accumulation of skills. Hence, while reducing EPL may have a positive effect on productivity 
via the improved-allocation channel, the overall effect on productivity is not easily established if smaller EPL 
ultimately entails a deterioration in the economy’s ability to accumulate the right amount and type of skills. 
Not surprisingly, the theoretical discussion on the effects of EPL on productivity is inconclusive, and so is the 
current state of the empirical literature. In this section we aim at providing some new empirical evidence 
taking advantage of the natural experiment provided by the Fornero reform. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is in fact one of the few existing evaluation exercises of the effect of EPL reforms on productivity. We 
show our results first and, in the final section, we discuss the implications of our findings in light of the 
theoretical arguments laid out in section 3 and of the limited available literature on the relationship between 
productivity and EPL.  
As before, our analysis hinges on the estimation of an equation similar to equation (1). This time, 
though, the dependent variable is a measure of firm productivity. As in section 6, the unit of analysis is the 
firm. The first difficulty in carrying out such an evaluation is related to the need to find firm-level data 
containing accurate information on firm productivity. Neither the LFS (which is a worker level data) nor RIL 
(which lacks reliable measures of firm productivity) is suitable for our analysis. On the other hand, the AIDA 
data, distributed by Bureau Van Dijk, contain detailed information on official annual balance-sheet data for 
the universe of limited companies, as long as their turnover is over 100,000 Euros (a rather minimal 
15 
 
threshold). One noticeable feature of the AIDA data, beyond the accuracy of the relevant indicators of firms’ 
performance, lies in its large sample size: over 900,000 firms are included, covering the period 2006-2014, 
for a total of almost five million observations.    
We have computed the productivity of each firm in any given year in two ways. First, as the log of 
the ratio between its value added and the number of its employees, thereby providing a measure of labor 
productivity. Second, as the residual in a OLS regression of the log of value added on the log of the firm’s 
number of employees and the log of a firm fixed assets, what is referred to as total factor productivity (TFP).4  
In all specifications, estimated by OLS, we control for regional dummies, dummies for sector of activity (at 2-
digit detail) and year dummies. One caveat of the AIDA data is that it only covers incorporated businesses. 
However, firms of all size are otherwise included. To make our analysis more directly comparable with the 
analysis of section three, and in light of the large sample size provided by the original AIDA data, we can 
afford to restrict the sample to firms with 10-15 employees and firms with 16-49 employees, for a total of 
over 600,000 observations. Notice, also, that firm size is measured as a continuous variable in AIDA. This 
allows us to control flexibly for firm size, through a cubic polynomial in the number of employees. Hence,  
our identification strategy combines the DD set up offered by the reform with a regression discontinuity 
(RDD) design (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). In the RDD jargon, firm size is the running variable. Here 
identification is achieved by comparing, before and after the reform, firms just below and firms just above 
the 15-employee threshold, while allowing the dependent variable (here productivity) to depend flexibly on 
the running variable. 
Table 6 collects the results. The table is organized to show a large number of separate regressions, 
obtained by estimating an equation similar to (1) on: (i) different samples, (ii) alternative productivity 
measures (value added per worker and TFP), and (iii) using different estimation methods (OLS or panel firm 
fixed-effect methods). In total, we run over 40 separate estimations, over the samples described by the rows 
in column (1). For instance, row 1 shows the effect obtained when considering firms of any size; row 2 instead 
restricts the sample to firms 10-49, while other rows further exclude firms in the 16-19 segment, or focus on 
different sectors, or exclude the indicated years. For ease of exposition, we only report the estimates of the 
coefficient of interest, the interaction 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇, which gives the productivity impact of the reform.  
A cursory look at column (3) of the table shows that the Fornero reform was followed by an increase 
in labor productivity. The effect is however relatively small in magnitude: when restricting attention to firms 
in the 10-49 segment, the increase in the level of labor productivity is always lower than 5%. The effects are 
however precisely estimated, also owing to the large sample sizes. The effect are still positive, with only a 
slightly smaller magnitude and with a similar level of statistical significance (at the 1% level) also in the case 
                                                          
4 We also reconstructed the capital series using a version of the perpetual inventory method, as in Card et al., (2014). 
Experimentation with these two alternative measures of capital never produced any relevant differences in the 
estimated results. 
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of TFP, suggesting that the results are not driven by differential capital accumulation over the time periods 
by different firm types.  
In columns (5) and (6) we take advantage of the longitudinal dimension of the AIDA data: individual 
firms can be followed over time thanks to the availability of unique identifiers (the firm’s fiscal code). This 
allows us to add firm fixed effects to the estimated models, and hence rely only on the within-firm variation 
as a source of identification. Hence, the estimates in these columns also control for firm time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity, which might be correlated with both match quality and a firm’s selection into 
treatment status. Comparing columns (5) and (6) with corresponding estimates in column (3) and (4) shows 
that controlling for firm fixed effects results in even smaller productivity effects, but the effect remains 
positive and statistically significant in all rows (with the only exclusion of row 9, column 5).    
We finally wonder whether the results hide some major heterogeneity across sectors of activity. In 
fact, the effect is still positive and statistically significant in both the manufacturing and the service sector 
samples. Moreover, the estimates do not in fact reveal a clear pattern of productivity impact across the two 
sectors. While the productivity impact of the reform is somewhat smaller in the service sector with the OLS 
methods, the relative impact is reversed in the estimates that control for firm fixed effects. We further 
elaborate on these sectoral differences in our next, concluding section.  
 
8. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper takes advantage of a recent Italian reform to study the relationship between EPL and the quality 
of the match between workers and firms. Using a DD approach and measuring the quality of matches in terms 
of dispersion around sector- and occupation-specific median educational attainment, we find that the reform 
led to an improvement in the probability of a good match by 9.5%. We also provide evidence that the 
reduction in EPL favored labor reallocation, a potential mechanism for the improved match quality. 
Consistently with some time lag for this reallocation to take place, the improved match quality is not visible 
during the first year after the law’s enactment, but only during its second year. We also find evidence that 
the reduced mismatch took place mainly through a reduction of under-education among mature and old-age 
workers. Finally, we conducted a preliminary econometric analysis on the effect of the reform on firms’ 
productivity, finding that the reduction in EPL was followed by an increase in productivity, albeit small in 
magnitude. Our results on mismatch and productivity are in line with Kampelmann and Rycx (2012), who 
report that higher under-education is detrimental for productivity in their sample of Belgian firms.  
Essentially, this paper has provided new empirical evidence consistent with the idea that, when the 
constraints posed by EPL are relaxed, the given pool of skills and competencies can be more efficiently 
allocated, skill mismatch reduces, with a beneficial effect on productivity. While the results are broadly 
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speaking in line with the economic theory that informed labor market deregulation during the last decades, 
it is important to highlight a few final remarks and draw attention to current caveats and limitations. 
First, our data only allowed us to look at the quality of the match in terms of education, thereby 
neglecting the other dimensions of skill mismatch. While it is possible that the quality the match also 
improved along these other dimensions as a result of the EPL reform, future research should provide more 
direct evidence that this was indeed the case. On the one hand, we suspect that our finding that mismatch 
was not much reduced in the manufacturing sector, contrary to what happened in the service sector, while 
productivity increased in both sectors, provides an indirect indication that the skill reallocation was not 
confined to formal education, but interested at least partially various skills learned on the job, e.g., industry-
specific or at least skills portable within the traditional industrial districts that characterize the Italian 
economy. On the other hand, the productivity effect of the EPL reform is estimated to be rather modest, 
suggesting that we should not expect large gains from overall reallocation. This is consistent with the views, 
expressed by some social scientists, that the Italian labor market was already more flexible, and mobility 
higher, than traditionally believed (e.g., Contini and Trivellato, 2005). 
Second, our data do not allow us to say much about the way the reform affected skill formation. The 
curbed EPL may reduce the expected duration of the employment relationships. This may have adverse 
effects on the incentives of workers and firms to invest in specific skills, and be ultimately detrimental to 
productivity and competitiveness developments, particularly for CMEs, as neatly pointed out by Harcourt 
and Wood (2007). It is well possible that our productivity estimates are mostly capturing the immediate, one-
off positive impact deriving from worker reallocation, but fail to incorporate the more long-run effects 
deriving from skill formation. If so, future research might detect that a dismantling of EPL provisions is 
followed by an even smaller, and possibly negative, effect on a country’s competitiveness. 
Third, we focused on a reform that reduced EPL for workers on open-ended contracts. In principle, 
the new environment may push firms to substitute temporary with permanent workers (e.g., Schivardi and 
Torrini, 2008). If so, productivity may arise, at least according to the few empirical papers that find that the 
share of temporary workers in the firm is associated with a smaller productivity (Dolado and Stucchi, 2008). 
However, this effect might be countervailed by the fact that permanent workers are, by virtue of the reform, 
now “less permanent”, which may once again instill the negative productivity effects arising from lower 
accumulation of firm-specific skills. This is yet another issue that might benefit from continuing research using 
richer data, e.g. matched employer-employee data combining worker flows with firm financial information. 
Forth, one may question the effectiveness of EPL reforms when this is not accompanied by 
complementary reforms of the labor market and of the social security system. With the Jobs Act of 2014, 
Italy has taken further steps towards the reduction of EPL that, in the spirit of “Flexicurity”, were 
accompanied by significant improvements in the effectiveness and inclusiveness of its unemployment 
insurance (Picot and Tassinari, 2017). Progress on vocational training and active labor market policies, 
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however, has lagged behind, which might limit the gains from the changes in the enacted EPL reforms. More 
generally, deregulation to easy worker reallocation is likely to be a “blunt weapon” unless undertaken within 
a healthily growing economy, in turn requiring a sound combination of structural reforms, industrial policies, 
as well as a stable political and macroeconomic environment.  
Overall, we hope the results of our paper will contribute to the current debate about reforms under 
austerity, and will inform policy makers of other Mediterranean countries, such as France and Spain, 
considering or undergoing similar EPL reforms and to which our results potentially extend.  
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Tables and Figures 
FIGURE 1 – Share of good matches in treated and untreated units 
 
Source: own computations on LFS data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 – Test of the parallel trend assumption  
 Coefficient Estimate p-value Observations 
No controls -396.99 0.504 
317 
Year and quarter fixed effects -400.59 0.499 
Source: own computations on LFS data. Notes: robust standard errors; *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%; alternative 
specifications using the cell-shares of good matches and the logarithm of matches, do not affect the results. 
 
 
TABLE 2 – Baseline results  
 RRR p-value Observations 
Firms 11-15/20-49, overall effect 1.096** 0.021 
81,130 
Firms 11-15/20-49, first four quarters 1.040 0.386 
Firms 11-15/20-49, following four 
quarters 
1.156*** 0.005 
Source: own computations on LFS data. Notes: robust standard errors; *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%. 
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TABLE 3 – Robustness checks  
 RRR p-value Observations 
Panel A: unobserved heterogeneity 
Firms 11-15/16-19, overall effect 1.085 0.126 
50,231 
Firms 11-15/16-19, first four quarters 1.000 0.998 
Firms 11-15/16-19, following four 
quarters 
1.185** 0.014 
Panel B: contamination at worker level 
Firms 11-15/20-49, overall effect 1.120** 0.011 
59,692 
Firms 11-15/20-49, first four quarters 1.041 0.431 
Firms 11-15/20-49, following four 
quarters 
1.207*** 0.001 
Panel C: measurement error 
Firms 11-15/20-49, overall effect 1.098** 0.014 
81,130 
Firms 11-15/20-49, first four quarters 1.073 0.103 
Firms 11-15/20-49, following four 
quarters 
1.125** 0.019 
Panel D: uncompleted education 
Firms 11-15/20-49, overall effect 1.107** 0.011 
78,441 
Firms 11-15/20-49, first four quarters 1.054 0.257 
Firms 11-15/20-49, following four 
quarters 
1.166*** 0.003 
Source: own computations on LFS data. Notes: robust standard errors; *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%. 
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TABLE 4 – Extensions  
 RRR p-value Observations 
Panel A: over- vs. under-education 
Over-education, overall effect 0.930 0.168 
81,130 
Under-education, overall effect 0.894** 0.014 
Over-education, first four quarters 0.968 0.582 
Over-education, following four quarters 0.892* 0.096 
Under-education, first four quarters 0.916* 0.089 
Under-education, following four quarters 0.872** 0.021 
Panel B: age class 
15-34 years old 
Firms 11-15/20-49, overall effect 0.972 0.754 
18,542 Firms 11-15/20-49, first four quarters 0.856 0.146 
Firms 11-15/20-49, following four quarters 1.112 0.385 
35 or more 
Firms 11-15/20-49, overall effect 1.108** 0.023 
62,588 Firms 11-15/20-49, first four quarters 1.083 0.120 
Firms 11-15/20-49, following four quarters 1.134** 0,030 
Panel C: sectors 
Manufacture 
Overall effect 0.976 0.712 
30,436 First four quarters 0.962 0.613 
Following four quarters 0.990 0.906 
Constructions 
Overall effect 1.037 0.796 
8,323 First four quarters 1.040 0.807 
Following four quarters 1.039 0.844 
Trade 
Overall effect 1.094 0.411 
13,283 First four quarters 0.995 0.970 
Following four quarters 1.207 0.182 
Other 
services 
Overall effect 1.237*** 0.002 
29,087 First four quarters 1.178** 0.033 
Following four quarters 1.300*** 0.003 
Panel D: geography 
North 
Overall effect 1.122** 0.024 
48,921 First four quarters 1.050 0.409 
Following four quarters 1.202*** 0.005 
Center 
Overall effect 0.975 0.777 
15,352 First four quarters 0.951 0.625 
Following four quarters 1.001 0.993 
South 
Overall effect 1.159* 0.099 
16,857 First four quarters 1.155 0.129 
Following four quarters 1.162 0.233 
Source: own computations on LFS data. Notes: robust standard errors; *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%. 
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Table 5 – The effect of the Fornero Reform on worker turnover 
 
Worker 
turnover 
rate 
Worker 
accession rate 
Worker 
separations rate 
Firing only 
Variables     
Post-reform 
period 
-0.659*** 
(0.118) 
-0.300*** 
(0.063) 
-0.401*** 
(0.065) 
-0.086*** 
(0.019) 
     
Firms above art. 
18 threshold 
-0.790*** 
(0.257) 
-0.411*** 
(0.138) 
-0.537*** 
(0.143) 
-0.147*** 
(0.038) 
     
Reform 
0.671* 
(0.388) 
0.322(*) 
(0.208) 
0.414* 
(0.210) 
0.101* 
(0.061) 
     
Controls Yes yes yes yes 
No. 
observations 45092 44836 44836 40821 
Source: own computations on RIL data. Notes: OLS regressions. Standard errors in parenthesis. The worker 
turnover rate is measured at the firm level as the sum of accessions plus separations during the relevant 
survey year, divided by the firm’s total number of employees at the beginning of the year. Accession rate 
(separation rates) are computed as the fraction of accessions (separations) on firm’s total employees. Firing 
only is the ratio between the number of firings and a firm’s employees. Standard errors in parenthesis. In all 
specifications, the controls list include: regional dummies, 1-digit sector of activity (Ateco classification) 
dummies, a cubic polynomial in firm size (no. of employees), dummy for incorporated business. ***, **, * 
significant at, respectively, 1%, 5% and 10%. (*) significant at the 12%. 
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Table 6 – The effect of the Fornero Reform on firm productivity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
row Sample VA per  
worker 
TFP VA per 
worker 
TFP 
1 all firms 0.114 0.107 0.106 0.074 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
2 firms size 10-49 0.043 0.038 0.025 0.014 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
3 as in row2, but excluding size 16-19 0.048 0.044 0.028 0.018 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
4 manufacturing, size 10-49 0.049 0.042 0.019 0.013 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
      
5 services, size 10-49 0.036 0.034 0.034 0.021 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
      
6 as in row4, but excluding size 16-19 0.056 0.050 0.024 0.018 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
      
7 as in row5, but excluding size 16-19 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.036 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
      
8 as in row2, but period 2010-2014 0.018 0.012 0.015 0.008 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
9 as in row4, but period 2010-2014 0.023 0.021 0.009 0.006 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
      
10 as in row5, but period 2010-2014 0.016 0.008 0.019 0.015 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) 
      
 control variables yes yes yes Yes 
  firm fixed effects no no yes Yes 
Source: own computations on AIDA data. Notes: OLS regressions. For each subsample, as described by 
column 1, entries refer to the estimated coefficient of the reform indicator (TREAT x POST); see equation (1) 
in the main text. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. In all specifications, the list of controls includes: a 
cubic polynomial in firm size (no. of employees), regional dummies, dummies for sector of activity (2-digit, 
Ateco classification), year dummies. TFP is defined as the residual in an OLS regression of the log of value 
added on the log of the firm’s number of employees and the log of a firm fixed assets. ***, **, * significant 
at, respectively, 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
